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Adam Tyson
The Mystical Debate: Constructivism 
and the Resurgence of Perennialism
Mysticism is at the heart of a pivotal and ongoing academic debate, yet it 
can be an uncomfortable subject to explore, mainly due to the myriad defini-
tions for the term mysticism that one encounters. Etymologically, the “myst” 
prefix has led to the colloquial use of mysticism as denoting practices, traditions, 
and beliefs that are simply shrouded in mystery. As Walter Stace puts it, “[it] 
is absurd that ‘mysticism’ should be associated with what is ‘misty’ . . . there 
is nothing misty, foggy, vague or sloppy about mysticism,”1 rather, it is charac-
terized by vivid experience. Academically, “mysticism” has been narrowed to 
describe “mystical experience” in no small part due to William James’ landmark 
exposition of mysticism in The Varieties of Religious Experience. Mysticism is 
anchored in experience, namely, mystical experience, and as a result, it is not 
one particular tradition, but a theme that can be found in any religious tradition 
correctly deemed mystical. 
Yet, to this day, what is termed “mystical experience” is still a hotly debated 
subject. On the modern landscape of this debate, there are at least two notable 
ideological camps which stand in opposition to one another: the perennialists 
1.  Walter Stace, “The Nature of Mysticism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Wil-
liam L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 363.
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and the constructivists. Two experiential events which may be considered mys-
tical, in the perennialist sense, are at the heart of the debate between these two 
ideological stances: Absolute Unitary Being (AUB) and the Pure Consciousness 
Event (PCE). Perennialists tend to claim that these events represent universal 
traits of mystical experience, while constructivists argue that there are no such 
universal traits. This paper seeks to conduct an exploration of Perennialism, and 
Constructivism as a response, after which the PCE and AUB events are analyzed 
in the context of that debate. Further evidence will then be drawn from mystical 
traditions to support the prevalence of PCE and AUB experiences. As a result, 
these two events will serve as a perennialist counterargument to constructivism 
and its mystical relativism, demonstrating the persevering utility of a perennial-
ist approach to mystical experience. 
I. PerennIalIsm and the ConstruCtIvIst resPonse
Perennialism can accurately be described as the dominant treatment of 
mysticism from William James’ exploration of mysticism in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, up through the constructivist response in the 1970s and 
1980s. The name is primarily derived from Aldous Huxley’s work which labeled 
mysticism as “the perennial philosophy.” Perennialists saw mystical experience 
as representing “a direct contact with a (variously defined) absolute principle.”2 
Since this “contact” can be found existing within several traditions, “Religious 
traditions, they argued, all teach a cross-culturally similar philosophy that does 
not change over the centuries, i.e., a perennial philosophy.”3 Evelyn Underhill 
posits a definition of mysticism that depicts this perennialist understanding of 
mysticism’s role in religion as a whole. Her definition describes mysticism as 
“the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete 
harmony with the transcendent order; whatever be the theological formula 
2.  Robert K. C. Forman, “Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting,” in The 
Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert K. C. Forman (New York: Oxford 
UP, 1997), 31.
3.  Ibid.
80 IMW Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4:1 
under which that order is understood.”4 The concept that mysticism is unitive 
survives through modern definitions, but what is problematic with Underhill’s 
definition is the use of the term “innate.” It is the innateness of the experience, as 
well as the assumption that a transcendent order actually exists, that has inspired 
the constructivists to vehemently reject such a definition of mysticism.
Constructivists, such as Steven Katz, Hans Penner, and Robert Gimello, 
put forth their pluralist theories in response to perennialism, each of which will 
be briefly discussed below. Each one has perceived perennialism as an academi-
cally accepted view. Constructivism is by no means exclusive to the discussion 
of mystical experience. It is an academic point of view that is closely related to 
pluralism, relativism, and subjectivism. Put simply, constructivism asserts that 
the individual constructs the surrounding world through his or her understand-
ing, explaining experience and perception with mental constructs. What this 
view means, in terms of how mystical experience is to be interpreted, is that 
1) there is no objective, numinous reality with which the mystic can interact 
or identify, and 2) there is no innate experience independent of mental and 
cultural constructs. 
Steven T. Katz’s Mysticism and Religious Traditions is a compilation of 
articles with primarily constructivist views on mystical experience, and contains 
an attack on the idea of an objective reality. His own article in this compilation, 
“The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience,” expresses the construc-
tivist distaste for claims to a transcendent reality:
The metaphysical naivety that seeks for, or worse, asserts, the 
truth of some meta-ontological schema in which either the 
mystic or the student of mysticism is said to have reached some 
phenomenological ‘pure land’ in which he grasps transcendent 
reality in its pristine pre-predicative state is to be avoided.5
There is good reason, from the constructivist’s point of view, why such 
4.  Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1999), xiv.
5.  Steven T. Katz, “The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and Religious 
Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983) 41.
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assertions of essential truth are so undesirable: reality itself is relative. Hans 
Penner elaborates on this point in terms of mystical experience, declaring that 
“[t]he basic assumption of the mystical relativist can be described as follows: 
what is meaningful, what is in accord with reality and not in accord with reality, 
shows itself in the context that a mystical system has.”6 In other words, it is the 
particular religious or cultural system that determines what “reality” is as well 
as how to achieve mystical union with it. This is opposed to one universal real-
ity which is experienced through multiple mystical paths as many perennialists 
would argue. Nailing down this point, Gimello bluntly asserts that “what various 
mysticisms have most in common is their fidelity to their respective traditions.”7 
Thus, the constructivist approach to mysticism, or mystical relativism, denies an 
objective reality, and as a result, any interaction with it by the mystic. This goes 
hand in hand with the second assertion of mystical relativism, that there is no 
innate experience independent of mental and cultural constructs.
II. the PCe and auB
Both the Pure Consciousness Event (PCE) and Absolute Unitary Being 
(AUB) are well worth a thorough exposition in order to evaluate their respective 
places amongst the Perennialist and Constructivist debate. Together they cover 
a range of experiences that are commonly considered mystical. 
 a. aBsolute unItary BeIng
The neuroscientists Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg are responsible 
for the creation of the term Absolute Unitary Being.8 Roughly speaking, AUB 
may be described as “theistic mysticism,” a mysticism that is deity-based. AUB is 
achieved after a journey from dualism to monism; it typically entails the soul, or 
the self, arriving at union with a divine entity or transcendent reality. Newberg 
6.  Hans H. Penner, “The Mystical Illusion,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions (see note 5), 93.
7.  Robert Gimello, “Mysticism in Its Contexts” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions (see note 5), 
84. 
8.  Eugene G. D’Aquili, and Andrew B. Newberg, The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious 
Experience (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999), 95–96.
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and d’Aquili describe this ascent in emotional and aesthetic terms in that its 
achievement is coincidental with ecstatic emotions and an overwhelming sense 
of wholeness, or unity. The concept of AUB is problematic from a constructivist 
standpoint because of its consideration of a numinous reality, or supernal being 
to whom the mystic ascends. 
B. Pure ConsCIousness event
Robert K.C. Foreman is responsible for the term Pure Consciousness 
Event,9 and has written extensively about it in addition to having experienced 
mystical states himself. Like AUB, the PCE is the result of a journey from 
dualism to monism, however, if AUB can be described as the ascension of the 
soul towards unity with the divine, the PCE is an inward journey of the soul 
into itself, achieving what is often termed the “void,” or pure awareness. The 
PCE is problematic from a constructivist standpoint, since there can be no un-
mediated experiences such as the supposed cognitive blankness of a PCE. The 
cognitive status of mystical experience is a subject of much debate and aside 
from individual claims, there is no way of knowing whether the mind ever is 
truly rid of conceptions as the PCE is purported to be.C. PCE and AUB within 
the Perennialist/Constructivist Debate
Yet for all this debate, a major fallacy is being committed on the part of 
both perennialists and constructivists; it is the importance that is placed on as-
sessing the “reality” of mystical experiences. An ethnographer does not need to 
assert his own belief in the religious system of the culture under study in order 
to appreciate the importance of religious belief and its impactful role in society; 
likewise, one need not accept that the mystic is uniting with a numinous real-
ity, but simply that the mystic claims to unite with such a reality. With this in 
mind, a perennialism that asserts the essentiality of a particular trend in mystical 
experience would appear misguided. Similarly, a constructivism that seeks to do 
away with the categorization of similarities between traditions would also ap-
9.  Forman, “Introduction,” in The Problem of Pure Consciousness, 8.
Adam Tyson: Constructivism & Perennialism 83
pear misguided, ignoring the many accounts of mystical experiences saturating 
religious texts throughout history. Both the PCE and AUB can be validated in 
a pragmatic fashion. First, time tested definitions of mystical experience can be 
applied to both, and second, mystical traditions provide striking evidence for 
the categorization into either Pure Consciousness Event or Absolute Unitary 
Being. 
First of all, this is no arbitrary division of mystical experience; mysti-
cism is often divided into categories of “external” and “internal.” Walter Stace, 
a noted scholar of mysticism, divides the experience into “extrovertive” and 
“introvertive” mystical experience:
One may be called extrovertive mystical experience, the other 
introvertive mystical experience. Both are apprehensions of the 
One, but they reach it in different ways. The extrovertive way 
looks outward and through the physical senses into the exter-
nal world and finds the One there. The introvertive way turns 
inward, introspectively, and finds the One at the bottom of the 
self, at the bottom of the human personality.10
Accordingly, AUB can be described as extrovertive and PCE as intro-
vertive. As stated above, both are monistic, or in Stace’s Neoplatonic words, “ap-
prehensions of the One,” but the respective paths indicate an external journey 
in AUB, and an internal journey in PCE. While these are different varieties of 
mystical experience, they share three significant traits that help define them as 
such: ineffability, a noetic quality, and a unitive perspective on reality. 
William James labeled “ineffability” as the first characteristic of mystical 
experience and it still holds today, although it requires some further elaboration. 
First and foremost, if mystical experiences were truly ineffable, there would be 
no accounts to speak of. Although the experience is ineffable, descriptions of 
what it is not—negative descriptions—are commonly used to explain a mystical 
experience. James describes this by stating:
The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as 
mystical is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it 
10.  Stace, “Nature of Mysticism,” in Philosophy of Religion, 367.
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defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be 
given in words. 11 
Yet—and not necessarily to the contrary—Ninian Smart provides valu-
able insight as to how negative descriptions are not strictly ineffable. He writes 
that “such terms as ‘indescribable’, ‘ineffable’ and so on are themselves perfor-
matives also, and help to express an off-scale sublimity beyond the usual rungs 
of the ladder of value and joy.”12 Thus, ineffability, in the case of mysticism is not 
to be considered strict ineffability, but rather, it simply necessitates the use of 
“performatives” such as negative descriptions and metaphors. 
The motivating force behind an attempt to describe mystical experience, 
however, often results from another one of James’ “marks” of a mystical experi-
ence, which he calls its “noetic quality.” By this, he means that certain knowledge 
is imparted through the mystical experience. In other words, a transcendent 
experience provides knowledge to the participant. James describes this quality 
as follows:
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem 
to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. 
They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by 
the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full 
of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they 
remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of 
authority for after-time.13
To highlight two aspects of this noetic quality, James first describes the 
experience as one that communicates knowledge in a way that goes beyond the 
“discursive intellect.” He then describes this knowledge as carrying weight even 
after the event of transcendence. 
Often the knowledge that is imparted through mystical consciousness is a 
11.  William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902; Wikisource, 2011), lectures XVI 
and XVII, http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=The_Varieties_of_Religious_Experience/
Lectures_XVI_and_XVII&oldid=912487.
12.  Ninian Smart, “The Purification of Consciousness,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions (see 
note 5), 123–124.
13.  James, Varieties of Religious Experience, lectures XVI and XVII.
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monistic representation of reality, bringing one to a third characteristic of mysti-
cal experience: a unitive perspective of reality. William J. Wainwright declares 
that “[m]ystical consciousness . . . is ‘unitive’” and that in this consciousness 
“[d]istinctions are transcended or overcome (although the way in which they 
are overcome varies from one type of mystical experience to another).”14 As 
Wainwright notes, and this paper has stated above, the path differs from tradition 
to tradition, but the goal in each is monistic. AUB is unitive in an extrovertive 
fashion, blending the self with a supernal presence, while PCE is unitive through 
the utter lack of distinction achieved in the state of Pure Consciousness. 
D’Aquili and Newberg place religious experiences and aesthetic states of 
unity at parallel spots on an ascending scale in their article titled, “The Neu-
ropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual, and Mystical States.”15 William James, like 
d’Aquili and Newberg, was interested in the emotional sensation of a totally 
unitive mystical experience, declaring that it is “[i]n this peculiarity” that “mys-
tical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect.”16 Within 
this spectrum, as the felt sense of unity increases, the emotional content of a 
corresponding religious state does as well. This spectrum consists of levels of 
classical aesthetics ranging from disunity to unity, or “Integritas.”17 Each rung on 
this aesthetic ladder has a corresponding emotional state, and type of religious 
experience associated with it. To exemplify this, Newberg describes “[a] transi-
tional phase between aesthetic and religious experience,” that is, “romantic love, 
which might be characterized by the phrase, ‘It is bigger than both of us.’”18 In 
this situation, aesthetic appreciation can be seen to coincide with the awe and 
corresponding emotional content in the religious sense. Newberg describes the 
ascent up the spectrum: “As one moves up this continuum, one moves through 
14.  Stace, “Nature of Mysticism,” in Philosophy of Religion, 356.
15.  Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, “The Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual and 
Mystical States,” Zygon 35, no. 1 (March 2000).
16.  James, Varieties of Religious Experience, lectures XVI and XVII.
17.  Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg, “The Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual and 
Mystical States,” Zygon 35, no. 1 (March 2000): 43.
18.  Ibid.
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the experience of numinosity, or religious awe,”19 until “the self becomes as a 
drop of water in the ocean of reality.”20 This final stage is what he and d’Aquili 
term AUB. For example, one of the ascending states “involves an elated sense 
of well-being and joy, in which the universe is perceived to be fundamentally 
good and all its parts are sensed to be related in a unified whole.”21 D’Aquili and 
Newberg place AUB at the very pinnacle of an emotional-aesthetic spectrum of 
consciousness: 
There is a progressive blurring of the boundaries between enti-
ties until one finally moves into Absolute Unitary Being (AUB). 
AUB is characterized by absolute unity. There are no longer 
any discrete entities that relate to each other. The boundaries 
of entities within the world disappear, and even the self-other 
dichotomy is totally obliterated. In AUB there is no extension 
of space or duration of time.22 
III. newBerg and d’aquIlI’s auB In mystICal 
tradItIons 
Newberg and d’Aquili’s model is worth being put to the test; whether mys-
tics, their texts and traditions, reflect this state in all its emotional, aesthetic, and 
spiritual manifestations can determine if the model has pragmatic use or not. 
Neoplatonic thought appears to affirm all of these in the state of Absolute Uni-
tary Being. Plotinus, a philosopher-mystic of 3rd century Alexandria, expounds 
the existence of a singular Unity, which he also terms the One, or even God, 
from which all existence both emanates from, and shares a part in. Speaking 
of the One he uses the highest Platonic Forms as points of reference, “while 
both The Good and The Beautiful participate in the common source, The One 
precedes both.”23 The One, then, is beyond even the highest platonic forms, that 
19.  Ibid.
20.  Ibid., 47.
21.  Ibid., 42.
22.  Ibid., 43.
23.  Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna and B.S. Page (Digireads.com Publishing, 
2009), 317.
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of “The Good” and “The Beautiful,” since form denotes difference, the highest 
Unity conceivable, the One, must necessarily be above even these forms. Here, 
Newberg and d’Aquili’s sense of wholeness accompanying AUB could not be 
more apparent. Since the Unity must remain perfect, the self is necessarily a 
part of this unity, and is capable of merging with the One through the very con-
templation of it. Plotinus recognizes that the pinnacle of being, AUB, conveys 
a strong emotional content, characterized by an ecstatic love. He writes of the 
union of the soul with the One, “Suppose the soul to have attained: the highest 
has come to her, or rather has revealed its presence . . . here is no longer a duality 
but a two in one . . . it is as lover and beloved here . . . so huge the happiness she 
has won to.”24 From this, one can see the aesthetic perfection in that the One 
is beyond even beauty itself, and the ecstatic emotional content of the soul’s 
merging from a spiritual belief in and contemplation of this concept. 
From this analysis, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu mysticism can be evalu-
ated similarly where the concept of a monistic God-concept, just like that of the 
One, exists. Meister Eckhart, a Dominican scholar, declares God to be “That 
being in comparison with which nothing better can be conceived”25— Plotinus’ 
very concept of the One having survived an entire millennium. Sufi belief re-
volves around the concept of uniting the soul with its infinitely divine origin, 
Allah. Of the same infinite scale as Plotinus’ “One,” is the Upanishadic concep-
tualization of Brahman who “though one, takes new forms in all things that live. 
He is within all, and is also outside.”26 
Brahman is also Atman, or the divine self, in the Upanishads. Several 
Hindu traditions borrow this concept, though under different names. In the 
Bhagavad Gita, Krishna declares, “Nothing is higher than I am; . . . all that exists 
is woven on me . . . ”27 Within various traditions, the self is capable of uniting 
24.  Ibid., 454
25.  Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Oliver Davies (Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin, 1994), 258.
26.  Katha Upanishad, part 5, in The Upanishads, trans. Juan Mascaró (London: Penguin Books, 
1965), 64. 
27.  Bhagavad Gita, trans. Barbara Miller (London: Bantam, 1986), 74.
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with a deity of the same infinite-beyond-conception scale. 
Newberg and d’Aquili would need to confront the constructivist criticism 
that there is no one transcendent reality which is being encountered objectively 
from each tradition. Fortunately they would rather “maintain an attitude of 
humility, rather than presume that our understanding of neurophysiology 
can give us an intrinsic knowledge of the relationship between ‘reality’ and 
consciousness.”28 Their model is just that, a mere model. Even though it is derived 
from brain imaging scans and is empirically grounded, there is hardly certainty 
regarding the correlation of the imaging to actual experience. Nonetheless, this 
model illuminates several useful, inter-causal links between aesthetics, emotion, 
and spiritual states, describing the progression towards AUB in terms familiar 
to the mystic. 
Iv. Foreman’s PCe In mystICal tradItIons
The Pure Consciousness Event can be defined as a mystical experience 
as determined by the criteria mentioned above: ineffability, the knowledge-
imparting noetic quality, and the presentation of a unitive model of reality. 
Robert K.C. Foreman cites examples to illustrate just what the PCE is as its 
ineffable nature evades description. In fact pure consciousness can be described 
as a state which does not seek description while engaged. The yogic philosophy 
of Patanjali perhaps exemplifies this state best. It refers to an inward journey, 
beyond the layers of selfhood, towards what is seen as the true self, purusa, the 
eternal soul. Patanjali describes this goal as the “enlightenment of the distinction 
between the pure Purusa and Buddhi”29 where Buddhi is the lesser self, the Ego. 
Patanjali’s path to one-ness is described in terms of going into one’s self, where 
“the mind rests in itself ”30 and “the awareness of one’s individual self gets lost.”31 
28.  D’Aquili and Newberg, The Mystical Mind, 120.
29.  Swami Hariharananda Aranya, Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali, trans. P.N. Mukerji (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1984), 7.
30.  Ibid., 7.
31.  Ibid., 8.
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This inward journey is seen elsewhere in Hindu philosophy and religious tradi-
tion. For example, in the Baghavad Gita, speaking of what essentially appears 
to be purusa, Krishna remarks, “[e]ternal and supreme is the infinite spirit; its 
inner self is called inherent being” and it “is the source of creatures’ existence.”32 
The Upanishads echo in declaring, “all things find their peace in their inmost 
Self . . . thus all things find their rest in Atman, the Supreme Spirit,”33 thus indi-
cating a parallel between Atman and purusa as the pure, true self. In essence, the 
PCE may be described as the consciousness resting in itself.
Yet, the PCE is by no means limited to Hindu tradition, it finds itself in 
many Buddhist manifestations, particularly in the concept of sunyata, or noth-
ingness. Specifically, the no-thought of Dzogchen in Tibetan Buddhism, like 
the aforementioned Hindu traditions finds this state of consciousness to be the 
natural, primordial state. Foreman even asserts that Meister Eckhart “discusses 
what he calls gezucken, a state of being enraptured without sensory or intellectual 
content” which he “understands as a transient encounter with what he calls the 
innermost within the soul . . . wherein God exists in purity.”34 
In his Mathnawi, Rumi presents a similarly inward approach to God, 
“O God, do Thou reveal to the soul that place where speech is growing without 
letters, That the pure soul may make of its head a foot (fly headlong) towards 
the far-stretching expanse of non-existence.”35 This state of consciousness is not 
necessarily associated with elative emotions like AUB, yet it is still accurately 
described as mystical; since the PCE is characterized by a lack of thought or 
distinction, it is inherently ineffable – it imparts knowledge about the nature of 
the soul and of reality, and this knowledge is of a reality unified through lack of 
distinction. Constructivist critics, however, have much to say on the matter of 
the Pure Consciousness Event.
32.  Bhagavad Gita, 79.
33.  Prasna Upanishad, fourth question (see note 26), trans. Mascaró, 72.
34.  Daniel C. Matt, “The Concept of Nothingness in Jewish Mysticism,” in The Problem of Pure 
Consciousness (see note 2), 146.
35.  Jalal al-Din Rumi, Maulana, The Mathnawí of Jalálu’ddín Rúmí, ed. and trans. by Reynold A. 
Nicholson (London: Trustees of the E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, 1926), 168.
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v. ConstruCtIvIst CrItIque oF the PCe and Foreman’s 
resPonse
Constructivists claim that there are no un-mediated experiences. What is 
here meant by “mediation” is actually two-fold; mediation of experience occurs 
on the individual level and, more broadly, on the cultural level. First, the indi-
vidual interprets every perception and experience, forming mental constructs in 
the process. Secondly, cultural constructs and religious systems provide the lan-
guage and concepts that the individual uses to interpret his or her experiences. 
Steven Katz describes these mediators as “forms of consciousness which the 
mystic brings to an experience” which “set structured and limiting parameters 
on what the experience will be.”36 He simplifies this, stating that “[p]re-mystical 
consciousness informs the mystical consciousness.”37 
First, Foreman responds to the undecided issue that it is the language that 
comes before the experience, Katz may “be accused of committing the fallacy of 
post hoc ergo propter hoc,” and iterates that “[t]he relationship between experi-
ence and expectation may be contingent, not necessary.”38In other words, just 
because a mystic’s experience of a PCE comes after a lifetime of culture and 
language, does not necessarily mean that those factors informed the experience. 
Though it may seem as though Foreman is somewhat dismissing the obvious 
impact of culture and language on one’s experience, there is actually good reason 
to stand his ground on this point. The very nature of a PCE is defined by a lack 
of distinction or discursive reasoning. No matter what language brings one to a 
PCE, ideally, it is the same experience. 
Hans Penner echoes Katz’s point writing that “[w]e must remember that all 
we have for understanding mysticism is language, not experience” and that it “is 
not mystical experience which explains mystical traditions or languages, rather 
36.  Steven T. Katz, “The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and 
Religious Traditions, 5.
37.  Ibid.
38.  Forman, “Introduction,” in The Problem of Pure Consciousness, 19.
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it is mystical language which explains mystical experience.”39 Not only is Penner 
committing the same post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy as Katz, and assuming 
the language precedes the experience, but as someone who has experienced 
mystical states, Foreman can actually attest to mystical experience preceding 
mystical language. By declaring that language, not experience describes mystical 
phenomena, Penner, as well as Katz, are insisting that all purportedly mystical 
forms of consciousness are lodged within discursive reasoning. This simply is 
not the case where many mystical experiences are concerned, especially given 
the role that ineffability plays in mystical experience. 
Foreman congratulates the Katz and other constructivists saying, 
“[t]hey have successfully removed the mystics from the perennialists’ borderless 
desert.”40 Yet, when Hans Penner declares “that mysticism does not refer to any 
particular kind of system or experience,”41 declaring the word itself to be what 
Totemism was to religion a century ago, he seems to think they have taken it too 
far. Hard-line constructivists appear to almost completely deny any possibility 
for common mystical threads between cultures. 
However, Foreman regards the PCE as one such common thread which is 
made all the more common by the fact that it is supposedly Pure Consciousness, 
and hence, something we all experience the same underneath language or con-
ception. Newberg and d’Aquili likewise consider Absolute Unitary Being to be 
a potentially universal trait in mystical traditions, contrary to mystical relativists 
such as Katz, Gimello, and Penner. Andrew Newberg’s neuroscience and AUB, 
as well as Robert K.C. Foreman’s PCE are quite possibly the last vestiges of mys-
tical perennialism to be found in the modern academic debate. They serve as a 
reminder that it is not such a mistake to conceive of human experience as being 
the same underneath those mental constructs that divide people into culture. 
Perhaps suggestions of universality are not at all unreasonable. In his book 
39.  Penner, “The Mystical Illusion,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, 91.
40.  Robert K. C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 43.
41.  Penner, “The Mystical Illusion,” in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, 95.
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In Gods We Trust, Scott Atran artistically describes similarities in human evolu-
tion:
Think metaphorically of humankind’s evolutionary history as a 
landscape formed by different mountain ridges. Human experi-
ence that lies anywhere along this evolutionary landscape con-
verges on more or less the same life paths, just as rain that falls 
anywhere in a mountain landscape converges toward a limited 
set of lakes or river valleys. This notion of landscape is a conduit 
metaphor in the sense that it serves as a guide for a multisided 
approach to the evolutionary riddle of religion.42
Relativism, constructivism, and pluralism are more than necessary to con-
structing an accurate understanding of human phenomena, but they can cause 
one to forget the overwhelming array of human similarities. From a constructiv-
ist standpoint, it is easy, and many times necessary, to tear down the perennialist 
treatment of mysticism. Surely it is at least as admirable an endeavor to unite 
experiences, traditions, and beliefs into categories that encourage accuracy and 
precision, rather than a hiding behind the negating curtains of relativism. 
42.  Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Oxford : Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 11–12.
